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The misleading and propagandistic tendencies in American news reporting have been a part of public discussion from its earliest
days as a republic (Innis 2007; Sheppard 2007). “Fake news” is hardly a new phenomenon (McKernon 1925) and it has been applied
to a variety of distinct phenomenon ranging from satire to news which one finds disagreeable (Jankowski 2018; Tandoc, Lim, and
Ling 2018). However, this problem has become increasingly acute in recent years with the Macquarie Dictionary declaring “fake
news” the word of the year in 2016 (Lavoipierre 2017). Fake news was internationally recognized as a problem in 2017, although
this latest version had been identified earlier (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014; Applebaum and Lucas 2016).  There are many
initiatives to counter this problem and the results have had varying levels of success (Flanagin and Metzger, 2014; Horne and Adali
2017; Sample et al. 2018). The inability to create a complete solution continues to stymie researchers and other vested parties
alike. A significant contributor to the problem is the interdisciplinary nature of digital deception.  While technology enables the
rapid and wide dissemination of digitally deceptive data, the manner in which the data is designed for consumption relies on a
mixture of psychology, sociology, political science, economics, linguistics, marketing and in some cases fine arts.
The authors for this effort discuss deception’s history, both old and new, from an interdisciplinary viewpoint, then proceed to
discuss how various disciplines contribute to aiding in the detection and countering of Fake News narratives. A discussion of
various fake news types (printed, staged events, altered photos and deep fakes) ensues with the various technologies being used
to identify these, the shortcomings of those technologies and finally the insights offered by the other disciplines that can be
incorporated to improve outcomes. A3-point evaluation model that focuses on contextual evaluation, pattern-spread and archival
analysis of both the author and publication archives will be introduced. While the model put forth cannot determine fact from
fiction, the ability to measure distance from fact across various domains provides a starting point for evaluating the veracity of a
new story.
  
 Contribution to the field
Fake news has generated research in various disciplines that offer new insights but a lack of research has been done that
examines the interplay between disciplines. The authors represent different disciplines and perspectives on digital deception by
discussing topics in their areas of expertise and applying those issues to other disciplines. For example: the relationship between
linguistics, sociology, computational linguistics, natural language processing software and data science are discussed.
Cybersecurity's role in digital deception identification and countering. Solutions that are discussed for digital deception are either
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Abstract 13 
The misleading and propagandistic tendencies in American news reporting have been a part 14 
of public discussion from its earliest days as a republic (Innis 2007; Sheppard 2007). ‘Fake news’ is 15 
hardly new (McKernon 1925) and the term has been applied to a variety of distinct phenomenon 16 
ranging from satire to news, which one may find disagreeable (Jankowski 2018; Tandoc, Lim, and 17 
Ling 2018). However, the problem has become increasingly acute in recent years with the Macquarie 18 
Dictionary declaring ‘fake news’ the word of the year in 2016 (Lavoipierre 2017). The international 19 
recognition of fake news as a problem (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014; Applebaum and Lucas 2016) 20 
has led to a number of initiatives to mitigate perceived causes, with varying levels of success 21 
(Flanagin and Metzger, 2014; Horne and Adali 2017; Sample et al. 2018). The inability to create a 22 
holistic solution continues to stymie researchers and vested parties. A significant contributor to the 23 
problem is the interdisciplinary nature of digital deception. While technology enables the rapid and 24 
wide dissemination of digitally deceptive data, the design and consumption of data relies on a 25 
mixture of psychology, sociology, political science, economics, linguistics, marketing, and fine arts.  26 
The authors of this paper discuss deception’s history, both old and new, from an 27 
interdisciplinary viewpoint, then proceed to discuss how various disciplines contribute to aiding in 28 
the detection and countering of Fake news narratives. The authors then provide a discussion of 29 
various fake news types (printed, staged events, altered photos and deep fakes), followed with the 30 
various technologies being used to identify these, an analysis of the shortcomings of these supporting 31 
technologies and finally the insights offered by the other disciplines that can be incorporated to 32 
improve outcomes. A three-point evaluation model that focuses on contextual data evaluation, 33 
pattern-spread and archival analysis of both the author and publication archives is introduced. While 34 
the model proposed cannot determine fact from fiction, the ability to measure distance from fact 35 
across various domains provides a starting point for evaluating the veracity of a new story.  36 
 37 
“If it is not true, it is very well invented” Giordano Bruno 38 
1 Introduction  39 
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Fake news has a long history in America (Innis 2007; McKernon 1925), becoming 40 
internationally recognized as a problem in 2016, the year it was declared word of the year by the 41 
Macquarie Dictionary (Lavoipierre 2017). The re-emergence of the term ‘fake news’ (Meza 2017) 42 
served as an inflection point for academics across various disciplines. Some academics observed the 43 
commonalities between ‘fake news’ and propaganda that uses a different delivery mechanism 44 
(Younger 2018), while others observed greater sophistication, customization and weaponization 45 
(Younger 2018; Verrall and Mason 2019). Those in academia and government who recognized this 46 
threat, some as early as 1997 (Szfranski others soon after (Cybenko 2002). Szfranski (1997) 47 
suggested that the weaponization of deceptive information would require protection of both 48 
combatants and non-combatants alike. While some groups of people are more resilient against 49 
deceptive data (Bjola and Papadakis 2020) suggesting a cultural component, significant populations 50 
remain vulnerable. The vulnerable also includes journalists, who repeat the stories that align with 51 
their own values. Even the journalists’ verification and validation mechanisms are corrupted by 52 
algorithms that provide information that aligns with targeted beliefs. Indeed, according to some 53 
behavioral scientists, all are vulnerable to the messages that confirm biases (Oswald and Grosjean 54 
2004). 55 
Media spheres like journalism require their journalists to act as watchdogs of information-56 
sharing for its global citizens. Their position in the world holds responsibility to provide independent 57 
truth and legitimacy to its audience by providing fact-checking. General verification procedures will 58 
be covered to transition into discussion about the importance of interdisciplinary work. Journalists 59 
intercept deception by reporting on the truth of our reality, having a general agreed normative 60 
approach to fact-checking including combating Fake news narratives even if interpreting false claims 61 
are still very much subjective (Graves, 2018; Mena, 2019). Five elements of fact checking provided 62 
by Bratich (2020) include: choosing claims to check, contacting the source of the claim, tracing false 63 
claims, working with experts, and showing their (journalists) work. Within this frame, journalism has 64 
become loaded with uncertainty, mistrust, and manipulation from its user engagement and many 65 
other trends, such as politics and emerging technologies, which intersect it (Waisbord, 2018). 66 
Pomerantsev & Weiss (2014) identified five goals of disinformation, of which fake news is a 67 
subset, these goals include; paralysis, demoralization, confusion, blackmail and subversion. 68 
Disinformation campaigns will seek one or more of these goals, with each of the five goals 69 
representing a strategy to use against a targeted group of people. For example, credible news stories 70 
that report opposite stories on the same event can, if both are professionally done, confuse a person 71 
who is new to the story and environment, rather than simply sway the person to one side or another.  72 
1.1 Fake News, Disinformation, and Manipulation 73 
The use of disinformation and misinformation in news has a long history. Some scholars have 74 
focused on misinformation, the inadvertent release of misleading or factually incorrect information, 75 
or disinformation, involving the intentional diffusion of factually incorrect claims for political 76 
purposes (Bakir and McStay 2018; Bennett and Livingston 2018). From a perspective of information 77 
warfare however, claims need not be false to have strategic value in manipulating an audience 78 
(Schafer 2018). Well timed, factually correct information can be as effective as a lie, when this 79 
occurs the information becomes weaponized. The authors contend that there is a distinction between 80 
information and its weaponization as the movement from an information logic to an identity logic 81 
within communications.  82 
Information is classically defined as “current data about developments in and the status of” a 83 
system at any given time (Downs 1957, 79). An information logic has three components. First, there 84 
is a temporal dimension. As information refers to the current status of a system or scene of events, it 85 
has a fleeting duration, “information that is repeated is no longer information. It retains its meaning 86 
I  r
i
Interdisciplinary Lessons Learned While Researching Fake News 
 
3 
in the repetition but loses its value as information” because it no longer updates one's understanding 87 
of a state of affairs (Lash 2002; Luhmann 1995, 67). The same materials may resurface repeatedly 88 
but, this defines an extended present which sublimates past and future and is no longer operating in 89 
an informational mode (Rushkoff 2013).  90 
Second, the contextualized component includes the scene or situation in which the activity 91 
takes place. Contextualized data is bound to the environment where it is created or resides. In this 92 
sense, data, particularly digital data, when taken out of context, perturbs the environment and traces 93 
from the perturbation will remain.   94 
Information has a third characteristic: information descriptive rather than moralizing or 95 
hortatory, does not call for action (Burke 1969, 41). Thus, information contrasts with emotionally 96 
polarizing communication content. Whereas the experience of sensory data may provide an updated 97 
status about local states of affairs, emotions “do not give us any information about the world” 98 
(Wittgenstein 1967, 491). 99 
  Both misinformation and disinformation point to informational disorders, an enduring aspect 100 
of the Downsean tradition within political science. Accurate information about states of affairs within 101 
a political system remains a critical currency, often in too short supply, which citizens require to 102 
make informed democratic choices (Converse 1962; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Grofman 1995; 103 
McGann 2006). Fake news is often taken as a species of disinformation as it is both a fabrication and 104 
“mimics news media content in form but not in process or intent” (Lazer et al., 2018, p. 1094). From 105 
this perspective misinformation and disinformation are distorting as these phenomena provide errant 106 
premises on which to make decisions in light of pre-given preferences (Hochschild and Einstein 107 
2015; Mathiesen 2018).While deception might be a short-term strategy for elected officials, if they 108 
seek re-election, there can be costs to deception during elections (Ferejohn 1990, 10). More recently, 109 
the rise of polarized electorates makes possible the continuation of informational disorders.  110 
1.2 Preparing for Fake News 111 
Deception is not limited to the political realm. Health/medicine (Spring, 2020), finance 112 
(Cybenko et al., 2002), the military and cyber domains are a few other environments where deceptive 113 
data or fake news have successfully been deployed. Deception relies on tricking both sensation and 114 
perception. In order for information to be perceived the data must first be sensed. Human perception 115 
and information processing are still not fully understood (De Faveri & Moreira 2016).  116 
 “Persuasion lies at the heart of political communications” (Flanagin & Metzger, 2014, 1). For 117 
Fake news to be effective, the deception must first be formed and then communicated. The 118 
communication process where the sender and the receiver share the same perception of information 119 
was defined by Gerbner (1956). Gerbner’s model of communications identifies the role of perception 120 
and contextualization in the message creation phase. Successful deception relies on influencing the 121 
thinking of the target (De Faveri & Moreira 2016). The target in the case of fake news is the human 122 
mind, and journalists are humans, thus, vulnerable to disinformation. 123 
The main target of fake news is the human mind. A key component of the human mind is 124 
decision-making, and as a result, there are numerous factors that feed into decision-making which are 125 
relevant to the topic. Before the human mind can process information, the data that forms the 126 
information must first be sensed, then perceived. Sensing occurs when one or more of the five senses 127 
are stimulated. Generally, speaking, sight and sound predominate in sensory stimulation, particularly 128 
so in the online world where fake news prevails, sensory deprivation makes possible the ability to 129 
control perception. Perception provides the input into decision-making, so a lack of stimuli (sensation 130 
data) or manipulated sensation data designed as context triggers the initial unconscious neural 131 
response for specific actions (Gazzaniga et al. 2014). Conversely, an un-sensed event is never 132 
perceived or a non-event. 133 
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While much focus on decision-making centers on motivation, the authors would be remiss if 134 
they did not list additional factors that impact human decision-making. Decisions rely on several 135 
factors that in addition to motivation include patience/impatience, risk attitude and ambiguity attitude 136 
(Gazzaniga et al. 2014,). Different factors suggest that the way decisions are made is diverse. Any 137 
single factor or combination of factors that dominate in any decision is most accurate as a post-hoc 138 
exercise. Furthermore, all factors discussed in the decision-making process are situationally 139 
dependent. 140 
 Decisions can be broken down into two types; conscious, otherwise known as action-outcome 141 
decisions, and unconscious, also referred to as stimulus-response (Gazzaniga et al. 2014; Khanneman 142 
2011; Djisterhus 2004). Both types of decisions are influenced by biases. De Favari & Moreira 143 
(2016) described patterned deviations from fact in perception as biases and heuristics; cognitive 144 
shortcuts (McAlaney and Benson 2020). Regardless of the type of decision being made, the biases 145 
still influence the outcome. However, the message creation can vary.  146 
 De Favari & Moreira (2016) examined deception in the hostile cyber environment and 147 
described three groups of biases: personal and cultural, organizational, and cognitive. It was noted 148 
that while highly effective, biases are difficult to obtain (Ibid). However, this observation preceded 149 
widespread knowledge of the role of social media in fake news targeting and dissemination (Shu et 150 
al. 2017 several sources).  151 
The new role of social media in content creation, delivery and dissemination of fake news has 152 
changed the landscape in unanticipated ways, requiring a re-examination of the means to identify and 153 
ultimately mitigate this type of deception. For this reason, the authors are examining some of the 154 
common disciplines involved in fake news, or digital deception within the model describing content, 155 
distribution and archives defined by Sample et al. (2018). 156 
1.3 Deception as a Strategy 157 
The assumption and assertion of this paper is the role of fake news to achieve political, social 158 
and potentially other forms of influence utilizing deception as a strategy. Deception as strategy has 159 
roots in ancient human behavior; observed in early history including Greek mythology (Phaedrus, 160 
2008, p438). In more recent times, Erfurth’s treatise on Surprise (Erfurth, 1943) provide helpful 161 
insights. Erfurth observed that almost all decisive military victories have been preceded by surprise, 162 
which relies on secrecy and speed. Deception is a form of surprise, providing a means to unbalance an 163 
opponent through uncertainty. Handel’s detailed analysis of deception at the strategic and operational 164 
levels in World War Two also offer relevant observations. Deception must be believable to the target 165 
audience, with sufficient resources and time invested in a coherent narrative to reinforce existing 166 
beliefs. “The susceptibility to conditioning is one of the most fundamental human proclivities to be 167 
exploited by deception operations” (Handel, 1987, p14). Conditioning greatly precedes the actual event 168 
of deception. Conditioning lays the groundwork upon which the deception capitalizes. 169 
Disinformation, a critical form of and enabler of deception, has a history in both warfare and 170 
state security functions. The use of disinformation as a form of deception is examined by Whaley 171 
(2007, p8), in the historical context that it was originally a World War One term applied by the German 172 
General Staff and then adopted by the Russians. Applying Shannon’s communication model, relevant 173 
but false information is fed into a communication channel, forming a third transmission category to 174 
signal and noise. This third category described by Whaley (Ibid) may be disinformation or 175 
misinformation depending on intent. Misinformation is inadvertent, whereas disinformation 176 
deliberately seeks to overload, discredit or realign an audience’s information management capabilities. 177 
Given the requirement to consider intent, disinformation has little utility without a purpose. Having 178 
understood the target and obtaining a means to access information and information networks, then 179 
subsequently exploiting those networks to expand access, disinformation provides the means to utilize 180 
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supporting conditioned biases and narratives with the intent to influence perceptions and behaviors 181 
(Waltz, 2008, p4).   182 
The Soviet concept of maskirovka encapsulates the complexity of the problem space surrounding 183 
deception. Although the term maskirovka can be defined as camouflage, it extends in Soviet doctrine 184 
across a broad array of strategic, operational and tactical measures to obscure intent, maintain security 185 
and confuse the adversary (Glantz, 2008, p2). Whilst there are numerous instances of maskirovka 186 
strategies being successfully employed throughout World War Two, which have helped inform modern 187 
doctrines and techniques, it is also important to note that failures occurred when maskirovka was 188 
employed hastily, was poorly coordinated, enacted by personnel with inadequate training (Ibid, p14), 189 
or conducted in a stereotyped or patterned manner (Ibid, p10).  190 
A critical observation of the maskirovka concept is the employment of a variety of techniques at 191 
all levels, in a planned and coordinated manner that also sought to embrace complexity with significant 192 
focus on aligning tactical outcomes with strategic intent. This appears to be common when compared 193 
with today’s use of fake news. The employment of various tactical and operational approaches to 194 
achieve a broad strategic intent allows for multiple target audiences to be engaged with sometimes 195 
conflicting narratives and thematic episodes. This tactical and operational flexibility could be regarded 196 
as dangerous and counter-intuitive from the strategic perspective, however it does appear to provide 197 
freedom of maneuver across the information environment and the ability to leverage the complexity of 198 
the modern information environment to achieve specific outcomes efficiently, and with speed. The 199 
ability to roam widely, engaging with numerous audiences, themes and narratives, at speed, appears to 200 
be a force multiplier in the employment of disinformation and fake news through social media and 201 
online forums. Moreover, this approach capitalizes on a number of perceived failures by trusted 202 
agencies to apply their moral and ethical narratives consistently; meaning that conflicting narratives 203 
by fake news agencies can always be excused by way of pointing to inconsistencies by previously 204 
trusted establishments who have perceived conflicts of interest, often amplified by the same fake news 205 
outlets. 206 
The identification of target variables and the ability to fashion specific messages at an individual 207 
level, refined based on personal and cultural data, appears to support the contention that a single, 208 
cohesive narrative is not required in the modern world. Fake news agents, marketers and political 209 
organizations can target specific individuals based on individual data collected from internet 210 
fingerprinting and social media. Target variable data can distinguish at an individual level likely biases, 211 
beliefs, and likely actions through personality profiles. The more traditional media, government and 212 
military refers to target audiences in a different, less precise manner, based on broad narratives and a 213 
focus on broad beliefs and groupings with an assumption that these descriptions will lead to specific 214 
group behaviors. It appears from these differences and the rapid evolution of supporting technologies, 215 
that disinformation campaigns have a distinct advantage in the modern information environment. In 216 
the instance where one can focus on the issues specific to each individual and tailor the message to 217 
alter behavior around those issues at a personal and granular level, it appears that the narrative can be 218 
delivered in a micro, targeted manner. The alternative appears to be the delivery of grand narratives 219 
and themes supported by ‘trusted’ agencies who rely on their self-perception of impartiality, which is 220 
quickly a target for fake news agencies and those who are likely to benefit from distrust of alternatives 221 
to the fake news narratives. It remains to be seen if the employment of fact checking, controlled 222 
narratives and traditional information operations approaches are sufficient for the information 223 
environment of the future. Results to date are not particularly positive. Perhaps part of the problem is 224 
the inconsistency inherent in modern life – it is not inconceivable to act contrary to one’s beliefs based 225 
on more personal, pertinent matters which are fleeting. That is a matter priests, theologians and ethicists 226 
have grappled with since the dawn of organized religion. Personality and culture, discussed later within 227 
this paper, are factors that are likely to contribute to these outcomes. 228 
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The modern context of disinformation as applicable to fake news, extends from the fundamental 229 
concepts of deception as a strategy and some of the principles discussed above. Susceptibility to 230 
conditioning, bias, narrative and the exploitation of information and social networks are all 231 
fundamental to the concept of fake news. These concepts will be discussed in more detail throughout 232 
this paper. 233 
2 Background  234 
The weaponization of information is enhanced in the digital world where communities are 235 
created not only through borders and national boundaries, but also by shared thoughts that include 236 
shared hopes and fears (Bennett 2012). In the information age where decision-making, especially in 237 
western style democracies carries great importance, the ability to control sensing and manipulate 238 
perception in online communities is extremely valuable.  239 
If war is political, and politics inhibits a variety of attributes of war, modern politics is in many 240 
ways invested in the preparation for war, and our existing politics may even stem from and reproduce 241 
a set of relationships established through war (Virilio and Lotringer 2008). The existence of nuclear 242 
deterrence as a variation of the “stability-instability paradox” may incentivize sub-kinetic forms of 243 
warfare, which can be harder to deter precisely because efforts to restore deterrence conventionally 244 
can risk nuclear escalation (Gartzke and Lindsay 2019, 14). Clausewitz (1982) termed war as politics 245 
by other means. However it is equally possible in the modern context of hybrid war, political 246 
warfare, gray-zone conflict, and the like, politics may be a continuation of warfare by other means 247 
(Foucault 2003).  248 
Information warfare weaponizes communications in order to effect change in a target audience 249 
in terms of their attitudes and behaviors. If content is the currency of propaganda, then timing 250 
performs a similar function for information weaponization. The strategic communication of 251 
information can be a “source multiplier” shaping one’s understanding of situations as well as shaping 252 
“the operational environment” so as to neutralize an adversary as well as advance one’s own strategic 253 
objectives (Armistead 2004, 1). While information warfare retains the descriptor “information,” it 254 
denotes a field of communication that is transformative more than informative. Information 255 
operations achieve these ends by seeking to “influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making 256 
of adversaries” while protecting those capacities for one’s own side. As decision making is largely 257 
biased, and biases are behavioral in nature, the shaping of attitudes and beliefs is key to success in 258 
this environment 259 
Although information warfare has often been conceptually confined to a space of military 260 
warfare, there is growing recognition that it “can take place in any situation across the spectrum of 261 
war or peace” (Morgan and Thompson 2018, 10) whereby warfare extends into political life in a non-262 
kinetic, non-physically violent form (Singer and Brooking 2018, sec. Kindle: 325). This new type of 263 
warfare has been referred to as hybrid warfare (Comin & Filol 2014) and enacted in numerous 264 
countries (Atkinson 2018), where fake news as a weapon of information warfare plays a prominent 265 
role (Younger 2018).  266 
Politics has become a problematic center in Fake news reporting; journalists are criticized for 267 
being non-partisan during fact-checking procedures coupled by general misunderstandings that they 268 
are responsible for fact-checking future statements from politicians, leading to increased user distrust 269 
in mainstream media (Uscinski, 2015). These trends have caused a shift in the traditional hierarchical 270 
information sphere regarding how truth is reported. Interdisciplinary work can address some of these 271 
issues. Social media has transformed the landscape of information reporting, meaning that solutions 272 
to combat Fake news depend on the flexibility of traditional journalistic pathways to produce fact-273 
checking frameworks clear enough to account for such change. Much like cybersecurity issues faced 274 
today, the information flow of fake news is unprecedented and at times overwhelming; mounting 275 
pressures on journalists to discern truths has allowed for both increased verification and 276 
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vulnerabilities to occur in reporting. For example, fact-checking the credibility of sources is a 277 
common task, but there are many examples in mainstream media where this is not done. Many 278 
journalists recognize the presence of information disorder (Plotkina et al., 2020). Information excess 279 
from virtual space produces a reporting experience that can cause fact-checking to be synonymous 280 
with instantaneous discernment of sources to then act, or not act, upon. Generally, journalists do 281 
agree that taking the time to do fact-checking thoroughly is more important than being the first to 282 
cover a story, but this is not always a tangible result (Schapals, 2018). Journalism, unlike many other 283 
spheres, has an advantage in its ability to report on evolving fake news concepts at the rate fake news 284 
articles are being produced because of its unique access to information streams. 285 
There is an alternative view that modern information operations occur in a globally competitive 286 
environment, influenced by the integrated nature of the world trade and political systems. Future 287 
World War is unlikely due the looming threat of nuclear conflict, so instead political objectives are 288 
achieved through kinetic and non-kinetic proxy wars. Cyber and information are just some of the 289 
domains and environments where we see this competition. Even from a warfighting perspective, in 290 
many cases the actual implementation of information operations as a component of military 291 
campaigning is focused on managing kinetic events against a narrative and coordinating non-kinetic 292 
effects to achieve specified outcomes. Therefore, the concept of information warfare can portray a 293 
more integrated and planned approach than is often the case. Governments and societies, even 294 
totalitarian regimes, must balance a variety of internal and external forces to shape their strategic 295 
objectives and narratives. For the purposes of this paper, however, we will refer to information 296 
warfare in the context of ideologically and politically driven fake news, which seeks to manipulate, 297 
deceive and change behavioral outcomes through disinformation for long-term strategic advantage. 298 
While some aspects of campaigning fit within an informational economy, others bear a closer 299 
resemblance to the strategies and tactics of information warfare. Information by itself simply informs 300 
an audience about the current situation, leaving the parameters of decisions unchanged. Information 301 
becomes weaponized at the point that it shifts a target audience by either reshaping the environment 302 
or the preferences, attitudes and even identities of the target audience in order to produce judgements, 303 
decisions and behaviors favorable to the initiator (Marcellino et al. 2017, 9). This can be subtle. For 304 
example, rather than changing a person’s desire to vote for a party, it is enough to simply convince 305 
someone not to vote on the day of the election. Value sets and beliefs are not always the target. 306 
Sometimes it is enough just to influence behavior for a short period to achieve the desired outcome. 307 
The purpose of news is to inform the target audience which differs from the weaponization of 308 
information that seeks to deceive or manipulate through transformation of one’s perception of a 309 
situation or through transformation of self-identity. The realignment of interests, attitudes, and beliefs 310 
through communications creates a “consubstantiality” between persons such that they come to see 311 
themselves as the same, at least within a certain set of parameters for acting (Burke 1969, 21). 312 
Underlying the creation of consubstantiality involves shifting identifications with political objects 313 
and actors, as well as their understandings of themselves in relation to the political world. Identities 314 
are always relational, demarcating what one is and, simultaneously, what one is not (Connolly 2002). 315 
Information warfare, therefore, involves the strategic and tactical use of information which operates 316 
on the order of identities, shifting the alignments of a target from one set of political identifications to 317 
another, with the goal of shaping behavioral outcomes.  318 
The focus on shaping identities and behavior is not limited to warfare between international 319 
adversaries. In contrast to the informational terrain of political conflict which has informed models of 320 
spatial competition and political opinion formation, political preferences are not prior to campaigning 321 
but shaped by political identities which are constructed through campaigning over time. Evidence 322 
points to the primacy of a politicized identity over information cues in understanding American 323 
political behavior. Political identity is irreducible to differences in issue positions as research shows 324 
policy positions even on fundamental issues such as abortion shift in line with partisan identities over 325 
I e
i w
 .                                                 Interdisciplinary Lessons Learned While Researching Fake News 
 
8 
This is a provisional file, not the final typeset article 
time (Achen and Bartels 2016; Mason 2018). While personality characteristics of candidates might 326 
be one calculation along with policy considerations, the explanation for political behavior predicated 327 
on the basis of an identity logic is quite distinct from the informational logic of policy preferences as 328 
policy preferences are derivative of partisan identifications rather than the other way around.1    329 
An identity logic contrasts along all three dimensions of the informational logic. First, in 330 
terms of the target of definition, identities define actors rather than inform as to the state of a situation 331 
in which action occurs. Personal identities are composed of “the commitments and identifications 332 
which provide the frame or horizon within which I can determine … what is good, or what ought to 333 
be done, or what I endorse or oppose” (Taylor 1992, 27). The normative entailments of identities 334 
function in communications as an “inducement to action (or an attitude, attitude being an incipient 335 
act)” (Burke, 1969: 42).  336 
Second, information and identity logics are temporally distinct. By overlooking the unique 337 
timestamps, deep fakes and computer-generated fake news can work in deceiving targeted users. In 338 
contrast to the instantaneous and fleeting nature of information, identities temporally integrate an 339 
actor providing a sense of continuity over time and space (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 340 
2014, 5). The repetition of identity claims perpetuates an identity narrative which preserves a sense of 341 
ontological security in the face of changing circumstances over time (Giddens 1991, 53–54). On the 342 
other hand, identities can be weaponized at the point that ontological security is put in jeopardy 343 
through communications which undermine one’s trust in political actors and institutions or one’s 344 
standing in the political system.   345 
Third, in contrast to the descriptive nature of information, the moral horizons which define 346 
identities provides a language “for objects contain[ing] the emotional overtones which give us the 347 
cues as to how to act towards those objects” (Burke 1984, 177). In online communications, “identity 348 
can be a shared feeling” as “people recognize themselves in the emotions of others” (Zaharna 2018, 349 
60). The contrast to emotional appeals is descriptions of external objects and events without reference 350 
to the experience of those objects and events2. Emotional appeals can problematize identities as in the 351 
case of repeated communications seeking to induce anger or fear and can give rise to anxieties – a 352 
tactic used by the Russian social media efforts to move Americans to de-identify with the existing 353 
political order (Jensen 2018). 354 
2.1 Fake News: Content Creation, Delivery and Dissemination 355 
Effective content creation relies on several different disciplines from target selection (military, 356 
political science, biology, psychology, and sociology) in service of creating memorable content. The 357 
content must resonate with the intended target, especially in an information rich society. For this 358 
reason, a discussion of linguistics, psychology and sociology is necessary. The delivery must be 359 
credible relying on psychology, sociology, linguistics, theater and more recently data science. 360 
Dissemination often relies on technology, thereby introducing cybersecurity into the mix. 361 
2.1.1 Linguistics: Analysis of propaganda tools 362 
Linguistics is a discipline that is used in the creation of deceptive data via rhetoric, however 363 
typically linguists are not consulted when countering efforts are necessary. Sample et al. (2019) cited 364 
the three well-known general attack types (ethos, pathos and logos) as methods associated with 365 
supporting fake news and why these methods must be considered in any fake news countering 366 
solution. Of the three rhetorical groupings, each presents challenges as well as opportunities for 367 
 
1 This is not to say that identity-based logics cannot be subject to spatial modelling (see Glazer, 1995). 
2 This is not to invoke a strong subject-object distinction denoting the object of description need not define the content 
and sources of subjects.  
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automated processing by combining the rules of linguistics and computer science when deploying 368 
computational linguistics. 369 
The linguistic analysis of fake news must operate across a range of domains and disciplines, for 370 
every act of language is embedded in a context composed of a wide number of different influences 371 
and drivers (political, social, cultural, ideological… as well as purely language-based). A study based 372 
on the identification of lexical and syntactic patterning as an identification and attribution tool (Dey, 373 
Rafi, et al 2018; Conroy et al. 2015) can only be one step in the analysis. Similarly, a rhetorical 374 
analysis, detecting both individual figures of speech and appeals to ethos, logos, and pathos (see 375 
below) is vital, but can only be a single element in a much broader and deeper examination of the 376 
target texts. This paper outlines a multi-disciplinary approach for the identification and countering of 377 
fake news in general; we can also see how a blended, multidisciplinary methodology can operate at 378 
the linguistic and communicative levels. A helpful overview of one such blended approach is given 379 
by Zhou and Zafarani (2018), but in what follows, an outline model for the investigation of fake 380 
news is presented, based on analyzing it not as single acts of language, but as a process of targeted 381 
communication, consisting of several elements, all of which must be considered to permit a truly 382 
informed understanding of how fake news is constructed, and how it functions. 383 
The following analytical schema is based on the seminal model of communication outlined by 384 
Shannon (1948), in which any communicative act is viewed as a process consisting of a message 385 
transmitted from a sender to a receiver via a channel (this is of course a simplification of the 386 
Shannon-Weaver model, but it is a useful starting point). The key thing to note is that while we can 387 
study each element in isolation, a truly sophisticated analysis considers how the various components 388 
interact and interrelate. For example, consider the issue of the chosen channel of transmission; 389 
different social media platforms operate in different ways (Twitter has restrictions of message length, 390 
Snapchat and Instagram are image-driven), and appeal to different demographics (Chen 2020). Just 391 
as fake news must be carefully crafted to reach and appeal to specific target audiences, so any 392 
effective countering-strategy must consider the most appropriate communicative approaches and 393 
channels to mitigate against it. It is known that there is a correlation between the age of online users 394 
(and their political opinions) and their likelihood to retransmit fake news (Guess, Nagler, and Tucker 395 
2019);  work remains to be done on determining not just why this group is likely to fall prey to fake 396 
news, but in devising strategies for mitigating against this.  397 
In order to conduct an effective analysis of fake news, we need to adopt the tools of corpus 398 
linguistics, and establish a robust database (or corpus) of previous fake news campaigns. The 399 
examples cited in Tenove et al (2018) and the two reports from the UK Information Commissioner’s 400 
Office (2018a and b) provide a helpful starting point. This will permit the creation of a detailed 401 
taxonomy of fake news, looking at sender/receiver/channel, and allowing a detailed analysis of types 402 
of message and their specific linguistic/rhetorical features. While work has already been done in this 403 
field (Digital Shadows 2018; Molina et al 2019), there is a pressing need for a much larger set of 404 
corpora, which will permit a fine-grained analysis. 405 
The final area for future research is that of traffic and social network analysis; in order to truly 406 
understand how fake news functions, we need to examine the ways in which stories spread across a 407 
platform, and how various users, such as trolls, bots and super users, act as prolific spreaders of 408 
misinformation. The development of tools for collecting, analyzing, and visualizing message spread 409 
over time is a priority. The issue of timescale is vital. For example, we need to consider what factors 410 
drive a particular item of fake news to disseminate rapidly across information space, while counter-411 
messages often lag far behind and over a much smaller area. One tool which offers a useful basis for 412 
R&D across the entire domain of social media platforms is FireAnt, a piece of open source software 413 
devised by Lawrence Anthony and Claire Hardaker (Anthony 2018) and another freely available tool, 414 
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the OSoMe tool developed at Indiana University (OSoMe.). OSoMe allows the capturing of data 415 
from Twitter over a set timescale; the data can then be visualized as a social network map, permitting 416 
the identification of key nodes of transmission. This in turn allows a fine-grained analysis of message 417 
spread and the possibility of targeting any countering-strategy towards the most prolific transmitters. 418 
The challenge will be to devise tools which can operate across the whole range of social media 419 
platforms (the image-driven, multimedia-rich domains of Instagram and Snapchat will be particularly 420 
testing). 421 
2.1.1.1 Ethos: Define a person or group 422 
“Persuasion lies at the heart of political communication” (Flanagin & Metzger 2009, 1); thus, 423 
the role of the messenger is highly relevant. For this reason, the messengers are targeted, as 424 
mentioned above. Gu et al., (2017) observed that the cost to discredit a reporter was $50,000. 425 
Flannigan and Metzger (2009) noted the role of credibility in presentation as well as perceptions of 426 
honesty and fairness, even when the message remained constant.  427 
Ethos defines the target or messenger (Cockcroft & Cockcroft 2005, pp. 28 – 54). The 428 
definitions for this activity can be positive or negative. In some cases, popular personalities or 429 
celebrities endorse politicians or politics (Scott 2006) or cures and in other cases negative nicknames 430 
are used to both topics associated with a considerable amount of fake news. In some cases, trusted 431 
reporters are targeted in an effort to damage their credibility. Attacking the messenger can take the 432 
form of discrediting a reporter, a publisher, an editor, or any other entity in the news supply chain.  433 
Fake news will inevitably build on the ideological/cultural/political values of the intended 434 
audience, or it will fail. Not only must it ‘speak the audience’s language’, as it were, but it must 435 
operate within the frame of reference held by that audience. In so doing the “us” against “them” 436 
narrative that is commonly deployed, can take hold adding an emotional tie-in.  437 
When ethos is deployed the good-bad dichotomy prevails, even though most individuals have 438 
both good and bad personality traits suggesting malevolence or benevolence with the target but not 439 
both. The use of ethos appeals to tribal identification and behaviors. Thus, this form of propaganda 440 
can be used with better efficacy on homogeneous groups in societies where fear of new or other 441 
groups predominates over curiosity or hope (Hofstede et al., 2010). In these societies “in groups” are 442 
viewed as having significantly different values than “out groups”.  443 
2.1.1.2 Pathos: Appeal to emotion 444 
This rhetorical grouping is characterized by the appeal to emotions; thus, the emotions of fear 445 
(Montgomery 2017) and hope (Menz, 2009) have a long-documented history of use in the political 446 
arena. Emotions play a critical role in political propaganda. Fear and hope have also been used in as 447 
motivators in military matters.  448 
Of the three approaches, pathos is the most immediately effective, acting as a means of short-449 
circuiting logic and rational thought, and aiming to evoke an immediate emotional response. This is 450 
due to the emotional nature of decision-making. When appealing to pathos punctuation can be a 451 
valuable tool. Punctuation was shown to act as a marker for propaganda in Israeli political discourse 452 
(Shukrun-Nagar 2009). 453 
2.1.1.3 Logos: Appeal to logic 454 
Any logos-based approach is highly challenging. Human beings are driven primarily by 455 
emotions, and the use of logical reasoning and data-driven persuasion will founder on the lack of 456 
statistical and general mathematical knowledge in the general public. Of course, statistics can be 457 
easily manipulated to customize narratives. In some cases, as noted by Pomerantsev & Weiss (2014) 458 
any narrative can be created, and a supporting reality can be created to support that narrative.  459 
Partial truths and partial lies provide input for propaganda. This type of logic is sometimes 460 
effective in political and scientific arenas. Consider, the anti-vaccination movement that believed that 461 
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vaccinations caused autism (Gross 2009). An unexplained rise in the number of autism cases along 462 
with a discredited article from a scientist (Wakefield 1999) with celebrity endorsements (Antrim 463 
2018) sounding credible created a combination of an ethos and logos-based appeal. Many conspiracy 464 
theories contain elements of logos mixed with pathos. The messaging must include terms that 465 
resonate with the target audience, word choices should reflect similar or the same words that the 466 
targeted group would use.  467 
2.1.2 Psychology: Understanding individual behaviors and thoughts 468 
Humans are fundamentally social creatures. Our social worlds are complex and require us to 469 
sift through information to determine what is truthful, and what we need to know to maximize our 470 
survival and personal growth. However, the amount of information that that we process is extensive 471 
and, in the digital age, delivered to us at high intensity. As noted previously heuristics are strategies 472 
that we use to take cognitive shortcuts in order to handle this information overload (Tversky & 473 
Kahneman, 1983), and are also known as cognitive biases. On occasion these biases may lead us to 474 
come to the wrong conclusion or to take the wrong action, but ultimately such biases are an adaptive 475 
strategy that help us navigate around our environment. Nevertheless, these biases may be targeted 476 
and exploited by the authors of fake news. For example, the secrecy heuristic may lead people to 477 
believe that any information that is presented from a ‘secret source’ is more reliable (Travers, Van 478 
Boven, & Judd, 2014). This heuristic is exploited in fake news stories that proclaim to reveal ‘leaked’ 479 
information. The acceptance of fake news can be further increased through the use of images to 480 
accompany the narrative that is being put forward (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 481 
2012), which again may exploit biases by leading the reader to assume that a visual ‘record’ is further 482 
evidence that a story is truthful. The inclusion of an image to accompany a fake news story also 483 
increases the likelihood that the story will be shared on social media (Fenn, Ramsay, Kantner, 484 
Pezdek, & Abed, 2019). Echo chambers (Boutyline & Willer, 2017) and filter bubbles (Holone, 485 
2016) created through social media platforms may further reinforce these cognitive processes, 486 
through the aforementioned heuristic of confirmation bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Research 487 
suggests that the acceptance of fake news items can be combatted through the application of 488 
epistemic cognition, which refers to how we gather knowledge about our world and develop our 489 
belief systems.  490 
Our understanding of our social world is also influenced by what we perceive to be the beliefs 491 
and attitudes of our peers. As noted above this can lead to the proliferation of fake news, but the same 492 
social influence can also be a powerful tool in combatting fake news. Indeed it has been observed 493 
that viewing critical comments from friends that challenge fake news items on social media is more 494 
effective in prompting people to question the item themselves than a disclaimer from the social 495 
media provider stating that the item appears to be fake (Colliander, 2019).  496 
Emotions are another determinant of the acceptance or rejection of fake news, as predicted 497 
under the feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 2012). Falsehoods are 70% more likely to be 498 
retweeted than the truth (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018). This could relate to several other forms of 499 
cognitive bias. Survival information bias refers to our tendency to pay attention to information which 500 
relates to the health and wellbeing of ourselves or those we care about (Stubbersfield, Tehrani and 501 
Flynn, 2015). An example of this is the tales of poison found within Halloween candy that are shared 502 
amongst parents each year, despite there being no record of this ever happening (Snopes, 2020). Such 503 
stories that invoke survival information bias in turn prompt emotional reactions. Similarly, social 504 
information bias refers to our tendency to attend to information that represents some form of 505 
deviation from social values or social norms (Stubbersfield, Tehrani and Flynn, 2015). An example 506 
of the exploitation of this type of bias is fake news stories which are based on a politician or celebrity 507 
involved in a conspiracy. This again stimulates an emotional response, which as predicted by the 508 
feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 2012) may be accepted as truthful. In keeping with theories 509 
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of social gossip this information is then shared throughout the individual’s social network, as it has 510 
been identified as important by the individual (Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar, 2006). Continual re-511 
posting and endorsement of a fake news item throughout a social network may contribute to the 512 
phenomenon of illusory truth, the effect exploited by marketers in advertisements for many years in 513 
which statements that are repeated are seen as being more truthful (Dechene, Stahl, Hansen, & 514 
Wanke, 2010), a phenomenon observed in relation to fake news stories such as those relating to 515 
vaccines and autism (Unkelbach, Koch, Silva and Garcia-Marques, 2019).  516 
One argument made is that people will tend to assume that information they are exposed to is 517 
truthful, as they draw upon their experience of the base rate where most of the facts they encounter in 518 
their lives are mundane and accurate (Brashier & Marsh, 2020). This assumption may be attributed to 519 
an anchoring bias where the target believes that because they are honest, that news sources are also 520 
honest. This is compounded when the information is received from a trusted source (Flanagin & 521 
Metzger 2009). 522 
Differences in cognitive ability appears to be another factor that predicts how easily a fake 523 
news story can be countered, with individuals who have low cognitive ability being less likely to 524 
change their initial acceptance of fake information when explicitly presented with the correct 525 
information (De Keersmaecker & Roets, 2017). This also relates to another cognitive bias known as 526 
the anchoring heuristic in which people will tend to keep any subsequent judgements close to their 527 
initial judgement, even if that initial judgement is proven to them to be incorrect (Northcraft & Neale, 528 
1987). A Cognitive Reflection Test is used by Pennycook & Rand (2019) to show that susceptibility 529 
to fake news is dependent thinking rather than partisan bias. Others support this rationale by citing 530 
increased vulnerability because of reduced analytical thinking and less open-mindedness (Bronstein 531 
et al., 2019). 532 
2.1.3 Sociology 533 
Cultural values and divisions caused by cultural values are used to define and continue the 534 
dialog. In many of the most recent cases, these values are used to stoke divisions and amplify societal 535 
polarizations (Azzimonti & Fernandes 2018). Interestingly, many of the divisions within the targeted 536 
society are tribal in nature, indicating that certain base values are similar in both groups (i.e. a desire 537 
to be treated equally; a desire to freely express one’s views) but that the “in group” versus “out 538 
group” dynamic that defines tribes within a society is the targeted societal fissure. This becomes 539 
relevant if the base values are the same, the targeted groups can then be manipulated into thinking 540 
that the other group is the problem using many of the same techniques. An example of such 541 
behaviors may occur when one group within a society seeks equal rights and another group perceives 542 
that in order for the first group to gain rights, they must lose or give up some of their own rights. 543 
While, logically this is not the case, the perception remains.  544 
Higher technologic capabilities and interactions associate with greater vulnerability to 545 
information warfare campaigns (Szfranski 1997). Information systems make it possible to transmit 546 
information at much greater speeds and volume than interpretation of the information occurs with a 547 
human. Szfanski (1997) identified a strategic and tactical component that identify identification 548 
(strategic) and restricting (tactical) disinformation. The authors contend that at the strategic level a 549 
fully integrated interdisciplinary response is required to accurately respond at the tactical level. 550 
Orientation differs based on cultural values and heritage (Szfranski 1997). Russia has been 551 
particularly active in stoking the immigration crisis in European Union countries (Volodymyr 2016). 552 
By speaking to fears of “outsiders” invading countries an increase in nationalism has arisen in host 553 
countries. Specifically, Russia has created and supported right-wing narratives that speak to native 554 
citizens fears of loss of cultural values and general well-being (Ibid). Culturally speaking, most 555 
western democracies exhibit a coexistence of high and low uncertainty avoidance (UAI) values 556 
(Hofstede 2010). Hofstede et al. (2010) noted an association between nationalism and high UAI 557 
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cultural values. According to Hofstede et al. (2010) high UAI values reflect a fear or uneasiness with 558 
the unknown, while low UAI values associate with a curiosity and willingness to learn about the 559 
unknown. The stoking of these and other cultural fissures or differences, in an open society, is easier 560 
with social media due to the wide reach of the communications medium. 561 
Successful campaigns impose false realities on the human targets (Szfranski 1997). Open 562 
societies are vulnerable to alternative viewpoints, the willingness to accept various viewpoints 563 
(Hofstede et al. 2010; Nisbett 2010; Minkov 2013; Sample 2015), while normally a strength and 564 
defense against weaponized information (Szfranski 1997) these cultural norms have been used 565 
against these societies through the promotion of carefully crafted false narratives that are in many 566 
cases quite sophisticated, and in all cases customized to the values of the targeted audience 567 
(Volodymyr 2016; Sample et al., 2018).  568 
2.1.4 Political Science: Influencing policies 569 
Fake news, or the tactical use of manipulative communications in a political context serves to deceive 570 
political actors in relation to their strategic intentions regarding a situation. That may involve efforts 571 
to distort political positions and options so as to move citizens to vote (or refrain from voting) on 572 
grounds that misalign their preferences and actions. It may seek to cloud decision spaces for voters or 573 
political authorities by introducing spurious issues that misdirect attention. It may seek to inflame 574 
relationships between groups in a population by amplifying differences. In this sense, malign fake 575 
news campaigns may be thought of as activities that place additional stress on political systems, 576 
thereby undermining their capacities to govern. On the other hand, a similar fake news campaign 577 
might deceive populations or political authorities in a direction that increases perceptions of trust, 578 
legitimacy, or the performance of the political authorities or the underlying system of governance 579 
(Easton 1975 -- These are the elements of a political system that might be subject to support or stress, 580 
too much stress, Easton noted, could lead to system break down and violence). These latter efforts to 581 
support a political system by celebrating its achievements is a common practice in nondemocratic 582 
countries like the People's Republic of China where government employees are often called upon to 583 
promote the legitimacy of the CCP online and an increasingly strict regime of censorship has 584 
prevented the emergence of critical commentary online (King 2017; Sear, Jensen, and Chen 2018). 585 
Such efforts might artificially inflate the support for a system to serve the interests of an existing elite 586 
and order, at the expense of efforts from the public to change the system. Either situation undermines 587 
democratic participation in a political system through distortions in the capacity to provide feedback 588 
and in its receipt by citizens and/or political authorities. 589 
Political science treatments of ‘fake news’ have focused on two distinct aspects. First, there is a 590 
question of whether foreign actors spreading fake news could have distorted the election results in 591 
2016 in the US. Second, scholars have studied the growing use of the term in recent times within 592 
political contexts, particularly its use as an epithet against journalists and perceived (other) political 593 
opponents. In terms of the interference question, the majority of the research suggests that it has had 594 
little impact on elections for two reasons. First, it is hard to distinguish Russian troll communications 595 
from other online sources, particularly those of the alt-right (Benkler, Faris, and Roberts 2018). This 596 
delineation between Russia and alt-right publications is blurred since Russia Today is a primary 597 
source of news stories for alt-right publications (Dorell 2017) who proceed to pass their articles to 598 
mainstream conservative sites.  599 
Related to this is the fact that domestic sources of news production and the campaigns 600 
themselves had considerably further reach than the Russian efforts, so it is unclear why Russian 601 
trolling would have produced an outsized effect compared to these other sources (Sides, Tesler, and 602 
Vavreck 2018). Further, research shows that there is doubt about the extent to which online 603 
manipulation campaigns have any effects on political campaigning and a general neutral effect as  604 
competing campaigns cancel each other out (Kall and Brookman 2018).  605 
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Analysis of information in understanding the effects of fake news or manipulative campaigning 606 
has focused on studies of voters and voter behavior which have emphasized the role of campaigns 607 
and media outlets in transmitting information to voters who make up their minds (Campbell and 608 
Center 1980; Downs 1957; Ferejohn 1990). Information efforts are considered independent of each 609 
other such that all information received, whether from a foreign state actor’s manipulation campaign 610 
or domestic news sources, are equivalent in their potential effects. Jamieson (2018) notes that this is 611 
not necessarily the case, as Russia has appeared to sequence its messaging in relation to information 612 
which was not necessarily public at the time, and the sequencing of Russian activity and other actions 613 
can have unique and amplifying effects.  614 
Further, although the literature in political science tends to find little evidence of a net effect of 615 
campaigning on voter choices, there are a few categories of places where they do find effects that 616 
may amplify the effects of targeted foreign interference activities. First, there is evidence that such 617 
campaigns have effects where candidates have controversial positions and there is a lot of investment 618 
in mobilizing voters supporting those positions (Kalla and Broockman 2018). This is consistent with 619 
the normalization effects that a coordinated covert influence campaign can have by making certain 620 
positions appear more reasonable through repetition (Kahneman 2011). Second, there is evidence that 621 
messages that provide grounds for people to express fear, and to take a limited and discrete action 622 
based on that message (e.g. like, retweet, vote once), can help create a persuasive narrative identity 623 
narrative for a voter (Jamieson 2018). 624 
Beyond that, there is a literature in political science focused on “misinformation.” 625 
Misinformation is often distinguished from disinformation in that the former is factually incorrect (a 626 
category overlapping with definitions of fake news) whereas the latter involves the intentional 627 
distribution of factually false claims for the purposes of inducing a political effect (Bennett and 628 
Livingston 2018; Chadwick, Vaccari, and O’Loughlin 2018; Tucker et al. 2018). In relation to the 629 
misinformation literature, there is research into the efficacy of correctives (Nyhan and Reifler 2010, 630 
2015; Vraga and Bode 2017). Some evidence suggests that false information can be corrected, but 631 
those effects tend to be limited to cases where an article of belief is not directly connected to one’s 632 
belief and identity structure (Garrett, Nisbet, and Lynch 2013).   633 
Finally, there is an area of study in political science regarding the use of the term, ‘fake news’, 634 
as a political epithet. Journalists and political opponents have been targeted with this term (Tandoc, 635 
Lim, and Ling 2018). Research shows that since the election of Donald Trump, there has been an 636 
upswing in the use of the term by politicians as an attack on others in places like Australia, and the 637 
use of the term is usually amplified through reporting in mainstream news where it is not contested 638 
(Farhall et al. 2019). Propaganda historically has been understood by political scientists to not only 639 
provide a favorable narrative for one’s own side but to demoralize the enemy and undermine their 640 
will to continue the fight (Lasswell 1927). There are wider corrosive effects on politics that some 641 
ascribe to this current era, where the ability to know truths is often put into question, with some 642 
suggesting that we live in a “post-truth” political era (Keane 2018). The consequence of undermining 643 
trust in political authorities, expertise, and expert systems can have many systemic implications 644 
beyond the discrete consequence of swaying an election as it can make a political system on the 645 
whole, ungovernable through its polarizing effects (Singer and Brooking 2018). Fake news today 646 
may involve a combination of foreign and self-inflicted wounds which erode the will of citizens to 647 
participate in democratic political life – precisely the condition Tocqueville feared would give rise to 648 
a form of despotism (Tocqueville 2010).   649 
2.1.5 Cybersecurity and Military Science 650 
Cybersecurity, a relatively new domain of war (Lynn 2010), was slow to react to the fake news 651 
phenomenon in spite of the fact that information systems, particularly social media were widely 652 
deployed in the targeting, delivery and dissemination of disinformation. Some of the reluctance to 653 
In v
iew
Interdisciplinary Lessons Learned While Researching Fake News 
 
15 
engage centered around the censorship versus freedom of speech argument, but another reason for the 654 
reluctance was financial. Social media sites such as Facebook have business models that are heavily 655 
reliant on advertising money. Interestingly, Taboola has been a common advertiser associated with 656 
fake news (Neilsen and Graves 2017).  657 
The argument continued but a change occurred when the role of Facebook and other social 658 
media sites became known in the selling of personal information to Cambridge Analytica 659 
(Cadwalladre and Graham-Harrison 2018; Risso 2018) where the data was mined for use in political 660 
circles. The sharing of personal information crossed the privacy boundary that is one of the core 661 
tenant areas of cybersecurity (McCumber 1991). The sale of user personal data (Cadwalladre and 662 
Graham-Harrison 2018; Risso 2018) and the customization of disinformation for the targeted users 663 
supported Szafranski’s (1997) assertion that civilians as well as military personnel will need 664 
protection from disinformation.   The drivers for change within the cybersecurity field are not 665 
currently strong enough to lead to the development of solutions. Until nation states seek to apply 666 
larger scale solutions and adopt policy changes that encourage the security of individual privacy 667 
rights, the cybersecurity industry has no incentive as a financially driven business area to address the 668 
problem. Indeed, commercial bodies have helped create this situation by repeatedly removing 669 
individual rights for privacy on the internet and creating a new norm, accepted by users, that they 670 
should trade their data for convenient services. A combination of commercial and legal drivers with 671 
strong law enforcement and government agency support has eroded anonymity on the internet. A 672 
strong incentive to change existing norms is likely to come from the application of targeted 673 
information operations on political, military and critical national security personnel on a scale that 674 
forces policy changes. However, without such a driver, until this paradigm changes and there are 675 
legal or financial costs associated with the commercialization of user data on the Internet, the main 676 
drivers enabling online fake news will continue. Unfortunately, the commercialization and lobbying 677 
which has emerged in this area makes it is unlikely that the cybersecurity industry will be able to 678 
address this problem in the near term, except as a supporting role to respond to policy change. Efforts 679 
to integrate financial payment systems with social media and news outlets is likely to further 680 
exacerbate the problem. In the meantime, greater education of users, policy makers and focused 681 
attempts to secure users through anonymized and secure applications is probably the best short-term 682 
solution available to cyber security practitioners. 683 
Historically, propaganda has been associated with wars for centuries (Sample et al. 2018) and 684 
was considered a military and political realm. However, the rise of hybrid warfare, wars without 685 
boundaries and the recognition of critical sectors that are outside the traditional scope of the military 686 
has resulted in an increased role for cybersecurity, and fake news is a new addition to the ever-687 
increasing growth of cybersecurity responsibilities. 688 
2.1.6 Data Science: Processing large volumes of fake news 689 
The work performed by Cambridge Analytica (Risso 2018) exemplifies the growth of data 690 
science in the fake news space. Originally used in marketing, another discipline that processes inputs 691 
from psychology, sociology and the arts, the algorithms have been more recently applied to political 692 
goals. There are several different types of algorithms ranging from history-based heuristics, through 693 
trees and neural networks. Each of these algorithms can be manipulated through their data to either 694 
re-enforce preferences or to steer preferences into a new direction. Furthermore, the algorithmic 695 
created filter bubbles that re-enforce beliefs are amoral and probabilistic in nature; thus, the stories 696 
presented to the user are similar in tone and accuracy. 697 
The ability to manipulate AI outputs, extends beyond fake news propagation and into all 698 
aspects of AI and machine learning (ML). The example of Tay (Riley 2016) the Microsoft chatbot 699 
that was trained to be helpful, but ultimately became abusive illustrates the ability to manipulate AI, 700 
and unintended direction through input manipulation of legitimate data. Weight and data 701 
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manipulation fuels research into adversarial machine learning (AML) and malicious use of AI 702 
(MUAI) and many of the deceptions that other domains encountered occurred earlier in fake news.  703 
The application of AI and ML in the creation, dissemination and countering of fake news 704 
represents a growth area in data science, as such, much has yet to be discovered. Deep fakes provide 705 
an example of this growth area. While data science can provide fascinating new insights to existing 706 
problems, the examples listed above remind us that the power of data science techniques can be used 707 
for benign, malevolent or benevolent applications. A key point to remember in data science is the 708 
importance of the query being processed. The phrasing of a query sets the algorithm on a weighted 709 
path based on the data learned during the ML process. Depending on the data classifications, results 710 
can vary to the same query, this action is observable when two people enter the same query into a 711 
search engine and receive different results.  712 
Despite the problems that AI and ML introduce, combatting fake news and other digital 713 
deceptions will be a job for AI/ML; Horne & Adali (2017) have already shown successes in using 714 
ML trained hosts to detect fake news. The accuracy will improve as the rules become more complete. 715 
Should the rules lack completeness, then fake news detection will be limited to detecting stories that 716 
fit a known pattern, signatures in cybersecurity parlance, and signatures have a low to non-existent 717 
detection rate with novel approaches. AI/ML are extremely proficient at detecting patterns, but the 718 
patterns must be familiar to the software; hence the need to create rules based on knowledge garnered 719 
from other disciplines. 720 
2.1.7 Theater: News as entertainment 721 
“All the world is a stage” (Shakespeare 2009), and fake news has a theatrical aspect. Theater 722 
can be thought of as a communal art form where the audience and performer share the roles of 723 
subject, spectator and benefactor (Abaka 2014). Similarly, fake news, particularly in an interactive 724 
mode of delivery (i.e. talk radio, live interactive TV news shows, and social media), creates the same 725 
dynamic.  726 
Theater, like fake news, is also interdisciplinary. The theater consists of eight major disciplines: 727 
acting, directing, writing, producing, costumes, set, sound and lighting design (Jones 2004). Each of 728 
these disciplines are discussed along with their role in the creation and delivery of fake news in 729 
support of seeking a shared, desired intention within the story and the audience. 730 
Theater requires the disciplines working together to create or manipulate the audiences’ 731 
thoughts and feelings. Fake news particularly uses propaganda delivered on trusted mediums in 732 
personal spaces such as talk radio in a car, TV in the home and social media on cell phones and 733 
personal computers. All of these devices are trusted transmission sources for the user. The messaging 734 
deploying the use of previously described propaganda techniques are delivered in an environment 735 
that the user has already deemed trustworthy. 736 
The story is most effectively told when the disciplines fuse together creating a final product 737 
that is greater than the sum of the collective parts. Jones (Hostetter and Hostetter 2011). Actors use 738 
voice, facial expression and body movement to convey the message that captures and unites the 739 
conscious and unconscious minds through shared presentation and decoding of words and symbols 740 
(Hostetter and Hostetter 2011). Similarly, reporters and commentators use their voice, facial 741 
expressions and body movement to both consciously and unconsciously deliver a message.  742 
Actors prepare by not only memorizing lines, but by drawing on emotional experiences that 743 
audiences can easily understand and find relatable, by using physical movement through expressions 744 
and body movement to convey emotions bringing to life the text of pathos. Once the message has 745 
been crafted the delivery must seal the emotional hold. The actor pulls from his own memory the 746 
emotions he wishes to convey, 747 
Once the message has been successfully delivered and sealed the re-enforcement can be taken 748 
care of through secondary actors known as trolls and bots. Trolls, paid personnel used to amplify a 749 
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message, can assume the role of unseen actors in support of maintaining the target’s engagement. 750 
Bots are the automated counterpart of the troll, performing the same duties through the use of AI. 751 
An actor seeks to tap into the audiences’ emotional memory (Stanislavsky 1989). Sight and 752 
sound are entryways into the imagination. Once an actor commands these two senses, they have a 753 
pathway into the imagination and can direct and manipulate the mind. Stanislavsky (1989) 754 
considered sight and sound the two primary senses and touch, smell and taste secondary senses that 755 
can be triggered through the primary senses. Stanislavsky (1989) noted that if an actor can appeal to 756 
only one of the senses, the remaining senses will also be available to the actor, all in support of 757 
influencing the audience’s emotional memory. One part of the director’s responsibility is to work 758 
with the actors to set the tone and intention for the play. The news director works with the news 759 
anchor to convey the tone and content of the story. The same news story compared across news 760 
stations can vary in length, tone and detail (Sample et al., 2018). In the case of interactive news, 761 
much like in the theater, mood and emotions can be extracted from an audience.  762 
Another important role that the theater director plays is in deciding what parts of the story 763 
remain and what parts are cut. Similarly, in news media, the director/producer/editor determines 764 
which stories, or portions of the selected story are presented to the audience. Recalling the earlier 765 
discussion on thinking, an event that is not sensed is not perceived, as with AI/ML, the flow of 766 
information is controlled by an entity in support of a specific intention. 767 
The writer relies on words, language, rhythm, pacing and musicality of language to be 768 
delivered by a skilled actor or anchor. All are well-crafted and integrated to achieve the intention of 769 
the story. The integrated whole is executed to play upon the values and beliefs of their audience. The 770 
use of memorable quotes or rhymes creates an indelible memory for the audience and the actor. Word 771 
choice for the story writer fits into manipulative linguistic choices, particularly those associated with 772 
pathos. Easily remembered phrases associated with fake news are effective methods of delivering a 773 
memorable message.  774 
The producer is the person in charge of operations including hiring of directors, actors and 775 
other personnel who support the vision. Casting of anchors and reporters sends an enormous 776 
conscious and unconscious message to the audience. Attractive speakers benefit from the halo effect 777 
while less attractive speakers are perceived as being more untrustworthy (Zebrowitz and Franklin 778 
2014). This finding suggests that a less attractive person would need to compensate for the 779 
untrustworthy impression, possibly by using intellect. The producer is responsible for all aspects of 780 
the production from vision, through operations and budgeting. In short, the producer is the 781 
production CEO possessing the holistic vision. 782 
Costumes add a sensual authenticity to the production. Something as seemingly small as hair 783 
and make-up can have a significant effect on how the audience perceives the actor in theater or the 784 
reporter for news. Consider the appearances of various news hosts and the consistency of appearance 785 
on each of the major news stations. Suits for men are the costume with ties being carefully chosen. 786 
Women, while not forced to wear suits also have clothing rules that allow for some flexibility of 787 
choice (Hillman 2013). Within the range of professional clothing attire, a range exists for various 788 
articles of clothing and accessories (Crilli 2018; Moeslein 2019). A clear difference can be observed 789 
when viewing before and after pictures of liberal and conservative program hosts.   790 
Set design provides the context or the visual environment. Color can set the emotional tone. For 791 
news, a simple calming blue background attracts attention, whilst red color, (Hillyard and Munte 792 
1984) suggests serious fact-based messaging. Red is a universal color alerting people to stop and 793 
focus their attention (Kuniecki, Pilarczyk and Wichary 2015). Breaking news alerts appear on a red 794 
background. When delivering fake news, the news anchor is typically placed on a set that matches 795 
the color scheme and set design of the traditional mainstream media news station where the news 796 
anchors are seated but leaning forward. A well thought out set design seamlessly supports the 797 
reporter’s performance.  798 
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Audio is the presence or absence of background sounds such as music, voices and other sounds 799 
which can also be used to set the mood and manipulate emotions. Dark low-pitched music 800 
accompanied with dark lighting and a dark background suggests a sense of foreboding, preparing the 801 
audience for bad news.  802 
Lighting is the remaining theatrical discipline. Lights and the shadows cast by lighting allows 803 
for creating a perception. Shadows cast over an object suggest something to hide or 804 
untrustworthiness. Bright light suggests honesty and integrity. A harsh bright light suggests shining a 805 
light on a dark or dirty subject, exposing what was hidden.  806 
All this points to the conscious effort of an entire production team to seek out the desired 807 
behavior, thinking and feeling of a target audience. When executed with precision and art, the 808 
audience has no real defense against it. Even the best professionals in this field find themselves taken 809 
away and moved by the production. The actor must live it, feel it, and experience the depth of human 810 
nature supported by all the other disciplines to achieve the goal set by producers, directors, and 811 
writers. How better to manipulate people into seeing things from our perspective and changing their 812 
point of view.  813 
For years, the delineation between news and entertainment has continued to blur (Edgerly 814 
2017). News reporters, while publicly claiming neutrality can convey messaging through 815 
expressions, intonation and movements, all methods of non-verbal communication that actors draw 816 
on. Reporters can convey joy, anger disgust, outrage and other emotions without changing the text of 817 
the story. The goal of all news reporter, much like an actor, is to keep the audience’s attention.  818 
3 Lessons Learned for Countering Fake News 819 
Since the problem is interdisciplinary in nature, any response that does not consider the various 820 
disciplines can only partially succeed at best. As a result, any models developed must bring together 821 
Data Science and Cybersecurity, in addition to linguistics, psychology and sociology along with the 822 
frameworks defined across these disciplines.  823 
Data science provides insights, however, requires carefully worded questions, and subject 824 
knowledge to form the best, most comprehensive queries. Cybersecurity informed solutions tend to 825 
be reactive suggesting that queries posed by cybersecurity professionals, may require further 826 
abstraction and typically result in limited insights even when new problem sites are discovered. 827 
Furthermore, the overall reactive posture can result in software missing new styles and techniques in 828 
fake news creation and dissemination. 829 
When combining data science and linguistics computational linguistics offers, some tools 830 
available that enable rapid detection of propaganda, for example, natural language processors (NLPs) 831 
have shortcomings that may be unfamiliar to data scientists. NLPs used in computational linguistics 832 
are able to quickly synthesize large volumes of data presenting common themes through “bag of 833 
words” outputs and sentiment analysis. The following sections provide a overview and explanation of 834 
each of the challenges with these areas.  835 
3.1 NLP problems 836 
NLPs group common words and emergent patterns in written text. To do so efficiently, several 837 
things must happen that can result in misleading outputs for the data scientist. As Data Scientists 838 
program the software, there are key considerations including: punctuation removal, case changing, 839 
word-stemming and filler word removal. 840 
• Punctuation removal: this is problematic because “!” and “?” and quotation marks are all a part of 841 
the sensationalism that elicits emotional responses from the reader (Cohen et al., 2018; Shukrun-842 
Nagar (2009) 843 
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• Case changing: occurs when software evaluates words when the ASCII representation for 844 
“News” is different than the one for “news”. To work around this problem, uppercase letters are 845 
converted to lowercase, and in most cases no problems result. However, with emotion-driven 846 
fake news where words are deliberately written in all uppercase to stimulate the visual sense, this 847 
important textual clue is lost by changing these words to all lowercase. 848 
• Word-stemming: results when NLPs convert adverbs to verbs, or convert verb tenses to the root 849 
word, so that “quickly” and “quicken” become “quick”. The problem is adverbs are words that 850 
are used to elicit an emotional response (pathos), by stemming these words another textual clue is 851 
removed.   852 
• Filler word removal: is performed when NLPs remove words such as “the”, “and”, “he” with the 853 
goal of avoiding filler words outweighing nouns and verbs. The problem is that the removal of 854 
pronouns also results in the removal of “us”, “we”, “they”, “them” important words in the “us” 855 
versus “them” narrative which is often deployed in propaganda. 856 
The challenges with NLPs listed above are easily solved when the programmer is aware of their 857 
existence. However, typically, and most often, the programmer remains unaware of the challenges 858 
and certain limitations of these types of programs. The problem with existing NLP packages remains 859 
when they are typically part of a larger software development effort and the examples are not 860 
considered. In some instances, developers do not know what they do not know. In many cases, 861 
packages can be modified, or pre-processers can be written that quickly address these problems. 862 
Much of NLP work aids AI/ML rules, so knowing the correct query to make, falls outside of the 863 
expertise of the programmer tasked with writing the software.  864 
3.2 Countering Content 865 
Cybenko et al., (2002) noted the importance of detecting the attack before the narrative can 866 
affect the target’s behavior. Of course, this suggestion seems to work posteriori as a method to 867 
prevent repeat mistakes. One suggestion was to detect the pre-conditions that exist as a method to 868 
inoculate the target (Ibid). Another would be to incorporate rules of propaganda into computational 869 
linguistics. The authors propose that three-point model of computational linguistics to address 870 
contextualization of data as well as the descriptiveness, pattern-spread analysis to address the 871 
temporal aspect and archival reputation analysis that adds temporal, context and descriptive values 872 
for additional analysis.  873 
 874 
3.2.1 Computational Linguistics – contextualization and descriptive analysis 875 
Fake news, by its very nature, consists of texts. Sometimes multimodal (employing, for example, 876 
audiovisual material), but overwhelmingly written compositions, designed to be transmitted (and 877 
retransmitted) across electronic/digital media to a carefully selected target audience. As 878 
communicative artefacts, they are open to analysis through linguistic tools, and as persuasive 879 
communications, they can be related to the body of work that has been done over centuries relating to 880 
rhetoric (the art of persuasive communication) in general, and propaganda in particular 881 
(see, inter alia, Connelly and Welch 2003, Ellul 1965, Jowett and O’Donnell 1999, Pratkanis and 882 
Aronson 1992.)  883 
In spite of the list of problems enumerated above with NLPs, for those engaged in combatting 884 
fake news, the ability to employ computer-aided social network analysis offers great potential for 885 
mapping (and ideally countering) the spread of misinformation online, by quickly identifying the key 886 
vectors of fake news and tracking (in near-real-time) the flow of fake news across the Web (Chetty 887 
and Alathur 2018, Hardaker and McGlashan 2016). The use of Computational and Computer-Aided 888 
Corpus Linguistics (the identification of key textual features through comparison of a target text with 889 
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a corpus or corpora of reference texts) offers a real possibility to create automated tools for the 890 
identification of fake news through its linguistic content and its removal from social media without 891 
human intervention, and for automated generation of effective counter-texts (Marquardt 2019, Pérez-892 
Rosas, Kleinberg, Lefevre, and Mihalcea 2018, Pathak and Srihari 2019).   893 
The rules of propaganda are well understood and the ability to modify software to enforce 894 
rules is attainable, particularly when ML is combined with statistical tools like group comparisons, 895 
and correlations to compare text. Many of the lexical expressions found in propaganda are synonyms 896 
which can easily translate to neighboring words in ML classifiers (e.g. “step” and “leap”) thus when 897 
phrases containing neighboring words are evaluated computationally, they will show that the distance 898 
between is statistically insignificant. Compared to traditional phrases used in conversation, where the 899 
word distance is statistically different, the ability to analyze and provide decision-making assistance 900 
is near real time.  901 
Other areas listed above can be quickly evaluated using simple linguistic tools or even scripts 902 
that can strip out and quantify punctuation symbols before they are removed without record. 903 
Similarly, the stemming problem can also be addressed as a part of preprocessing while preserving 904 
the important metadata. Computational linguistics works alongside data science and can provide 905 
much of the inputs needed to feed training data rules. 906 
 907 
3.2.2 Pattern Spread – temporal analysis 908 
For Fake news to spread, stories must be artificially promoted using trolls and bots (Rosenblatt 909 
2019). The use of these aids leaves digital traces. Vosoughi et al. (2018) illustrated this phenomenon 910 
showing the extreme volume of stories that saturate the news cycle. When combined with the 911 
credibility of receiving these false narratives from trusted sources and the speed in which these 912 
stories spread preemptive inoculation can become problematic.  913 
Suggestions by Cybenko et al. (2002) include information trajectory modeling to counter this 914 
tactic. Information trajectory allows for comparisons against historic data and distance measuring 915 
from the historic data. This approach can be used to model pattern spread as well as linguistic 916 
differences and was proposed by Sample et al. (2018). However, unlike the linguistics component 917 
there exists a lack of data for pattern spread of factual narratives and factual narratives will have 918 
varying baselines depending on the nature of the story. For example, a natural disaster with many 919 
casualties will show a different pattern spread than a special interest story, which differs from a news 920 
story surrounding a celebrity. If the fake pattern is the area of focus, the parties responsible will alter 921 
the behavior to keep the filters from detecting the pattern. In cybersecurity this is known as 922 
“fuzzing”. “Fuzzing” occurs when a character is changed in the signature string, allowing the new 923 
malicious data to slip in, undetected by the security filters. 924 
3.2.3 Metadata Analysis of Archival Information – time, content, context and reputations 925 
Data Science has been used and suggested for solutions to digital deception. This shows the 926 
enduring value of messenger credibility as discussed by Flanagin & Metzger (2009). Reputations can 927 
be discredited for an affordable cost and reporters are human, so mistakes will happen. A gullible 928 
reporter who is repeatedly fooled may not have a very long career in their chosen field, but a reporter 929 
who consistently reports the facts, with or without theatrics, will have a pattern that is worthy of 930 
being considered credible. Currently, this process is performed by humans when they evaluate the 931 
credibility of a source, and as previously discussed, the human decision-making process in this area 932 
is flawed and under attack. 933 
Data science can go beyond sentiment analysis and some of the other techniques discussed 934 
earlier in this paper. Every proposed countering technique will generate metadata about the collected 935 
data. This data is prime for fresh insights. Some of the metadata fields of interest may include but are 936 
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not limited to reporter information, publisher information, time information, context content and 937 
linguistic characteristics. A brief discussion follows. 938 
• Reporter information: Reporter bias scores, average story word count, average linguistic 939 
characteristics associated with the reporter including % nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, 940 
publisher associations, credibility score and sources used. 941 
• Publisher information: Publication bias scores, average story word count, average linguistic 942 
characteristics, reporters used, credibility score, average story lifecycle, average time to report 943 
and sources used.  944 
• Time information: given fake news typically has shorter lifecycles following deception discovery 945 
i.e. not everyone wishes to propagate it further; time distance from original source, lifecycle and 946 
early source trajectory are the key metadata fields of interest relating to time.  947 
  This archive of metadata with the small sample set of fields provides a starting point and is by 948 
no means exhaustive. This starting point allows for groupings to answer known questions and 949 
unstructured analysis groupings to inspire new lines of thought and question. Furthermore, by 950 
collecting and processing metadata the actual use space is smaller, resulting in a smaller and more 951 
efficient archive, containing links to larger more complete archives.   952 
3.2.4 The Role of Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning 953 
Horne & Adali (2017) were successful using ML software and satire as training data to 954 
demonstrate software could successfully detect fake news in the form of satire. While the findings 955 
were encouraging, the study looked for a specific type of fake news, satire. 956 
 AI is highly dependent upon the classification schemes attained through machine learning and 957 
both AI and ML are highly dependent upon the accuracy and veracity of the training data used. The 958 
fact that in cybersecurity, the poisoning of training data is an area of research should serve as a 959 
cautionary point. When rules are done well, AI and ML can easily outperform humans on many 960 
tasks; however, questions remain open on AI biases that may be intentionally or unintentionally 961 
inserted by the programmer (Bellovin 2019). Biases have been observed in facial recognition 962 
software (Nagpal et al. 2019) resulting in unanticipated outputs. The importance of balancing the 963 
training data requirements result in having to balance inadequate data that yields false results or over 964 
fitting provides accurate findings but with little to no abstraction. Striking this necessary balance 965 
requires an understanding of rules that lie outside the discipline of data science and cybersecurity, the 966 
two disciplines in the enforcement arena, and into the behavioral sciences space.  967 
4 Examples using the model 968 
The three-point model relies on evaluating use of linguistic features, pattern spread and archival 969 
reputation analysis. Included are some examples of the evaluations. On February 16, 2020, when the 970 
COVID-19 pandemic was in the early stages, Dr. Anthony Fauci was interviewed on by CBS news 971 
on the show Face the Nation. A transcript of the show (cbsnews.com) can be found in the public 972 
domain. Dr. Fauci’s remarks about the virus were approximately 646 words, containing no special 973 
punctuation and the ratio of adverbs to text was 1:215.  A few days later, on February 25, 2020 Rush 974 
Limbaugh also shared thoughts on the same subject, the virus, during his talk show. Mr. Limbaugh’s 975 
text was also made publicly available (mediamatters.org). Mr. Limbaugh’s word count was 756 976 
words, containing six special punctuation instances, five “?” and one “!”, along with an adverb to text 977 
ration of 1:126. Additionally, Mr. Limbaugh’s text invokes rhetorical devices discussed earlier such 978 
as plain folk talk. Thus, based on these few characteristics, Limbaugh’s words deviate from ground 979 
truth farther than Fauci’s. This is not to say that Dr. Fauci’s remarks are considered ground truth, but 980 
that Dr. Fauci’s words are measurably more trustworthy than Mr. Limbaugh’s. Limbaugh’s text 981 
suggests more than one standard deviation off ground truth and Fauci’s remarks would be considered 982 
under ½ standard deviation from ground truth. 983 
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Figure 1: Trending data Limbaugh and Fauci mid-February 984 
 985 
This brings us to the pattern spread. Th OSoMe tool (osome.iuni.iu.edu) allows for rapid tracking and 986 
visualization of hashtags and other social media features. When the Fauci and Limbaugh hashtags are 987 
compared in Figure 1, Limbaugh outperforms Fauci. Rush Limbaugh had been awarded the medal of 988 
Freedom in early February (notice the peak in the Limbaugh hashtag, followed by a drop that 989 
remains higher than Fauci’s even when Fauci’s interview aired. Even more interesting, is the delta 990 
between Limbaugh and Fauci on February 16, the date that the Fauci interview aired. The pattern 991 
spread appears to show the fact-based narrative underperforming. Only in March, once the pandemic 992 
had taken hold did Fauci surpass Limbaugh. Limbaugh had a full month (possibly longer) to deliver 993 
his version of the message to a larger audience. 994 
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This same phenomenon can be observed again with the face mask debate where “#nomask” drowns 998 
out “stopthespread”, illustrated in Figure 2. Then more recently, this pattern is observed again with 999 
the “#movetheelection” hashtag when compared to the real news of the sharp decline in GDP in the 1000 
US, as seen in Figure 3. The underperforming hashtags typically distribute longer, and the peaks tend 1001 
to be shorter than their counterparts associated with fake narratives. Thus, the fake hashtags would 1002 
result in the deviation value increasing. In the case of the #nomask hashtag this pattern of a steep, 1003 
dramatic peak with small tails was observed with election data in 2016 (Sample et al., 2016). 1004 
False or misleading narratives are also used to distract from factual news stories. This example was 1005 
recently observed when President Trump suggested delaying the November election as the GDP 1006 
quarterly data was released.  In this case, the large drop in the US GDP would normally be the 1007 
leading news item as this drop would be associated with a significant economic recession. However, 1008 
Figure 3 illustrates the Twitter feed of tweets for ‘delay the election’ drowns out the GDP data tweets 1009 
on July 30-31, 2020. 1010 
Figure 3: Twitter feeds for GDP drop and Delay the Election 1011 
 1012 
Pattern spread data can be valued by measurement from known good news stories pattern spread.  1013 
The final model point of reputation analysis can be thought of as a consideration of the source. In the 1014 
Fauci-Limbaugh example, the source of the Fauci interview is widely considered reputable. In this 1015 
simple example, Dr. Fauci has a history of speaking accurately, particularly when discussing medical 1016 
matters, thus, his overall accuracy value would be considerably better than that of Mr. Limbaugh. 1017 
This reputation analysis could be further enhanced by examining the sources that picked up both 1018 
speeches for publication and those sources could also be evaluated. A final scoring metric could 1019 
come from fact checking organization, where a point is also given for debunking a story narrative. 1020 
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The overall analysis when the three-point model is applied the closer to zero, the total score 1021 
(linguistic, pattern spread and reputation values) lands the more factually accurate the story.                                                                                                                                                                                                                1022 
5 Summary 1023 
Szfranski (1997) argued that information warfare attacks would be enacted against both 1024 
information systems and belief systems and that leaders and their supporting non-combatants would 1025 
both be targeted. This is currently the case with fake news. Szfranski (1997) thought that open 1026 
societies, such as western democracies would have better defenses than their autocratic counterparts, 1027 
but the results on this front are decidedly mixed. The current iteration of fake news or propaganda 1028 
operates in a jujitsu fashion, where a target’s strengths are used against itself, something that was not 1029 
anticipated with the rise of digital propaganda.  1030 
There are many different reasons for the widespread success of fake news. Key factors include 1031 
the refined targeting techniques, the breadth of the Internet reach, the trust of social media platforms, 1032 
the financial incentives for data management companies to sell information, and the use of open 1033 
values systems found in open societies against those societies. Some open societies (i.e. Finland, 1034 
Estonia, Latvia) have demonstrated resilience to fake news (Atkinson 2018) suggesting a possible 1035 
common set of values that have not been investigated. However, implementing defenses or 1036 
countering tactics at speed requires an interdisciplinary approach. Meeting this challenge requires 1037 
deep interactions that reflect a true exchange of ideas and implementation of models outside the 1038 
traditional disciplines that support a fused response to this new generation of espionage (Younger 1039 
2018). 1040 
Interdisciplinary work can help provide a more unified front to a currently fragmented, open-1041 
ended institution (Waisbord, 2018). Cybersecurity can aid in explaining how social bots spread 1042 
misinformation, this can help journalists understand how misinformation spreads online and address 1043 
increasing frustrations controlling Fake news propagation (Schapals, 2018). Psychology sheds light 1044 
on the phenomena of Fake news amplification by means of echo chambers and confirmation bias to 1045 
provide more conscious perspectives of how news, whether fake or not, is consumed in different 1046 
cultures and groups. Akin to other areas, for Journalism to adapt to change cultivated by the internet, 1047 
a discussion should be initiated that recognizes the integration of multi-dimensional solutions. 1048 
Journalists are responsible for the integrity and truth of their own reports but also recognize existing 1049 
understandings of Fake news spread is foggy (Mhamdi, 2016). Interdisciplinary approaches should 1050 
acquit Journalists from being solely responsible for policing fake news in today’s contemporary 1051 
digital environment and emphasize collaboration to account for other trends responsible for Fake 1052 
news proliferation in our information streams.  1053 
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